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Abstract—In the recent decade, it has been discovered that
QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of
practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating
region whereby only certain target detectors are sensitive to
detections. Crucially, the adversary can use this loophole to learn
everything about the secret key without introducing any error
to the quantum channel. In this work, as a step towards over-
coming detector blinding attacks, we focus on an experimentally
convenient countermeasure, where the efficiency of the detectors
is randomly varied.
Index Terms—Quantum Key Distribution, Blinding Attacks,
Countermeasures
I. INTRODUCTION
Introduced in 1984, quantum key distribution (QKD) is a
cryptographic technique that allows two spatially separated
parties, called Alice and Bob, to exchange provably secure
keys via an insecure quantum channel [1]. Since then, much
progress has been made in the theory and practice of QKD.
On the theoretical side, security proofs for various QKD
protocols have been obtained, and on the practical side, QKD
experiments have been demonstrated under real-world condi-
tions [2]. Having said that, however, there are still a few open
questions to be explored before QKD can be brought onto a
larger scale. For instance, research on countermeasures against
side-channel attacks is still very much a work in progress.
In the recent decade, it has been repeatedly pointed out that
one can exploit the internal working knowledge of single-
photon detectors to perform side-channel attacks on QKD
systems [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. More specifically, the adversary
(called Eve) can identify or engineer detector‘blind spots”
by using detailed knowledge1 about the detectors. In other
words, only selected detectors can de made sensitive, while
the rest are not. This in turn provides her with a platform to
concoct powerful side-channel attacks that are undetectable, at
least based on known parameter estimation methods proposed
in QKD. More precisely, in most QKD implementations two
separate detectors are used to record bit values “0” and “1”,
respectively. Eve can either profit from the temporal mismatch
of detection windows to shift the photons sent by Alice to
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1According to the Kerckhoffs’s principle, Eve knows everything about the
QKD system (e.g., the source and detectors characterization), except for the
input choices (i.e., the basis choices).
time intervals where one detector is sensitive and the other
is insensitive, and consequently learn the bit value (time-
shifting attacks [4]). Or, she can also use a so-called faked-
state attack [3], an intercept-resend attack to learn about the
secret key.
A prominent example of this latter attack is the blinding
attack, which cleverly exploits the physics of single-photon
detectors: Eve sends bright light pulses to bring the detectors
from the Geiger mode to linear mode, where the detectors
behave like classical detectors [5]. Then, via tailored bright
pulses (henceforth called trigger pulses), Eve can control the
response functions of the detectors. So for instance, she can
make sure that there are only clicks if Bob uses the same
measurement basis and therefore no errors are generated.
Abstractly speaking, the aim is to convert the response of
Bob’s measurement device into one that is dependent on Eve’s
attack strategies. We note that from the perspective of security
proofs, blinding breaks the fundamental assumption2 that the
probability of detection is independent of the basis used to
measure the incoming quantum signal [9], [8]. This implies
that Bob’s measurement data is generated from a distribution
that is conditioned some variables determined by Eve; there-
fore, it is not astonishing that Eve can learn everything about
the secret key without introducing any error. Indeed, as shown
by Qin Liu et al [10], the ideal control method corresponds
to the case whereby the response functions of Bob’s detectors
is deterministic and depends only on Eve’s trigger pulses and
Bob’s measurement choices.
Very recently, the concept of measurement device-
independent QKD (MDIQKD) [11] has been proposed as a
means to overcome all possible detector side-channel attacks.
This scheme is very elegant and demonstrates for the first
time that quantum entanglement can be used to overcome
some side-channel attacks. Roughly speaking, it employs the
concept of “time-reversal entanglement QKD” to delegate the
responsibility of the detectors to an untrusted third party called
Charlie, who (purportedly) performs a Bell-state-measurement
on the states. In practice, however, this requires two-photon
interference, which is experimentally challenging to imple-
ment [12], [13]. For this reason, it may be more practical
to consider practical countermeasures that are valid against
a smaller class of detector blinding attacks. For example,
2This assumption lies at the heart of parameter estimation: roughly speak-
ing, it implies that the set of quantum signals selected for parameter estimation
is a representative sample of the quantum signals used to generate the secret
key.
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2one may consider the countermeasure proposed in Ref. [14]
changing the detector electronics, however a security analysis
has yet to be made.
In this work, we analyze the security of an experimentally
convenient countermeasure against a large class of blinding
attacks. The proposal is based on an earlier idea suggested
in a patent made by ID Quantique [15], where Bob varies
independently and identically the efficiency of his detectors.
Note that a similar result has been obtained in Ref. [16], where
they used certain detection statistics to detect a large class of
detector side-channel attacks.
II. A COUNTERMEASURE BASED ON EFFICIENCY
RANDOMIZATION
The main idea is to randomly change the parameter settings
of the single-photon detectors, and then check the observed
detection rates after the measurement phase. If there is a
discrepancy between the observed detection rates and the
expected detection rates, Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
The countermeasure can be divided into four successive steps:
(1) random variation of the efficiency or activation timing
(see Ref. [15] for the definition of activation timing) of the
detectors (with at least 2 different values), (2) sorting of
the detections by efficiency or activation timing values, (3)
after sifting, comparison between the expected and measured
probabilities of detection and (4) if there is a discrepancy, abort
the protocol.
Here, we try to provide the intuition behind the countermea-
sure from the perspectives of theory and practice. For the latter,
we briefly discuss two hacking demonstrations that have been
demonstrated on a commercial QKD system called Clavis23;
note that QKD system is implemented with two single-photon
avalanche diodes working in gated mode. This means that
the detectors are in the Geiger mode when an electric gate
is applied on the diodes.
The first one is called the after-gate attack [17]. It con-
sists in sending bright light (trigger) pulses slightly after the
electric gate, when the detector is in the linear mode. If
the photocurrent generated by the trigger pulse is sufficient
to trigger the discriminator after the avalanche photodiode,
a fake detection can be generated on-demand by Eve. Note
that this fake detection occurs after the electrical gate, but
may still be accepted by the system if the time window of
the detection is larger than the gate width (which is the case
in the Clavis2 QKD system). A simple countermeasure is to
randomly apply a gate pulse or not (i.e. two different efficiency
values unity and null). It is quite straightforward to see that
Bob is able to detect the attack of Eve, since unexpected
detections will be generated whenever the electrical gate is
not applied. Therefore, by simply checking if the probability
of detection is null when the efficiency is null, Bob can detect
an after-pulse attack.
The second demonstration is the bright illumination blinding
attack [5], which was mentioned earlier in the introduc-
tion. Recall that in this attack, the detectors are put into the
3See http://www.idquantique.com/images/stories/PDF/clavis2-quantum-
key-distribution/clavis2-specs.pdf for the specifications.
linear mode by constant bright illumination, and this happens
whenever electrical gates are applied or not. Once in the
linear mode, Eve can fully control the detectors by sending
in specifically tailored bright trigger pulses during the gates.
Moreover, we conservatively assume that she can do it in
a way that no click is generated if no gate pulse is applied
(the linear gain being a bit smaller in that case). Hence, the
former simple countermeasure with the two efficiency values
null and unity does not work anymore. Therefore we consider
the case when the countermeasure is implemented with two
efficiency values which are not null. Suppose Bob chooses
randomly between 5% and 10% efficiency by changing the
height of the gate or the offset voltage value. The eavesdropper
should be able to generate fake detections with a probability of
success that depends on the efficiency value. Indeed, an attack
triggering clicks with a probability smaller than 1 has been
demonstrated in Ref. [18]. However, to our knowledge, there is
no demonstration of an attack that allows Eve to generate fake
detections with probabilities of success that are proportional
to the quantum efficiency of the single photon detector. These
examples suggest that the countermeasure is efficient against
a class of detector side-channel attacks.
On the conceptual level, the countermeasure can be seen
as a way to introduce a knowledge gap between Eve and
Bob, which makes it difficult for Eve to mimic the expected
conditional detection rates (i.e., conditioned on the choice of
the detector efficiency). In order to formalize the security
of the countermeasure, we consider a simple blinding model
inspired by bright illumination attacks, and we assume that the
response functions of the blinded detectors are independent
of the detector efficiency. This allows us to view the model
as a deterministic function of Eve’ trigger pulse and Bob’s
measurement choice. As we will see later, the conditional
detection rates can be used to bound how often Eve does a
blinding attack. In fact, incorporating this countermeasure into
the asymptotic security analysis of the BB84 protocol is rather
straightforward.
III. QKD SETTING
First of all, let us define the QKD protocol and the device
models which we are considering. Here, we consider a biased
basis choice BB84 protocol [21], where one basis is chosen
with higher probability than the other basis. Concerning the
modeling, on Alice’s side, she has a single-photon source,
which she uses to prepare single-photon states in one of the
four possible polarization states associated with two mutually
unbiased polarization bases. Specifically, the four possible po-
larizations are |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉, |−〉, where {|H〉, |V 〉} represents
the linear basis and {|+〉, |−〉} represents the diagonal basis.
On Bob’s side, he has a measurement device that allows
him to measure the incoming quantum signal either in the
linear basis or the diagonal basis. The measurement device is
modeled using the standard active basis choice measurement
setup: the basis choice is implemented using a half-wave
plate and the measurement is implemented with a polarizing
beam-splitter with two single-photon detectors placed at the
output ports. In addition, the detectors are assumed to be
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Fig. 1. Countermeasure against blinding attacks. On the practical side, the
countermeasure can be easily achieved by adding an intensity modulator (IM)
in front of most existing measurement setups, or by changing the bias voltage
of the detectors. The intuition behind the countermeasure can be understood
by first noticing that most blinding attacks crucially rely on precise calibration
of the trigger pulses. In particular, if the incident power is too low, then this
would result in additional detection loss, and if the incident power is too high,
there might be more double detections than expected. Importantly, we note
that for security reasons, a double detection is always replaced by a random
bit value [19], [20], which in turn reduces the amount of information Eve has
about Bob’s bit string; likewise, this also introduces additional errors between
Alice and Bob. For these reasons, Eve should send trigger pulses with a power
level that maximizes her information about Bob’s bit string [10].
ideal single-photon detectors, i.e., they have unit detection
efficiency and are noiseless. Therefore, we are working in the
so-called uncalibrated-device scenario. Finally, the efficiency
of the detectors is varied by using a variable attenuator. In
particular, Bob can choose two levels of efficiency, η1 and η2,
where η1 > η2 ≥ 0.
The protocol basically runs as follows.
1. Preparation. First, Alice generate a long string of
random bits. Then, for each bit, she prepares a single-photon
(with either linear polarization or diagonal polarization) using
that bit, and sends it to Bob via the quantum channel. Here,
recall that the linear polarization basis is chosen with a higher
probability than the diagonal basis.
2. Measurement. For each quantum signal sent by Alice,
Bob randomly sets the detector efficiency (via a variable
optical attenuator (VOA)) to either η1 or η2. In particular, he
chooses η1 most of the time. Then he measures the incoming
signal in either the linear polarization basis or the diagonal
basis.
3. Sifting. They publicly announce their basis choices and
keep only the bits corresponding to identical basis choices.
Additionally, they categorize the sifted data according to η1
and η2. This results in two sets of data, namely a raw key pair
(using the linear polarization basis and η1) and a parameter
estimation key pair (fusing the diagonal polarization basis).
4. Parameter Estimation. They publicly announce the
parameter estimation key pair to compute the error rate. In
addition, conditioned on Bob’s detectors efficiency choices,
they can identify two sets of conditional error rates, eobs,1
and eobs,2, which correspond to η1 and η2. In additional, Bob
calculates the detection rates, R1 and R2.
5. Classical Post-processing. Finally, they apply error cor-
rection and privacy amplification to the raw key pair to extract
a secret key pair.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
Let us now introduce the attack model we are considering.
We assume that (A1) Eve interacts independently and iden-
tically with each individual quantum signal, and that (A2)
she either performs an attack (i.e., a blinding attack with
probability qpc or a quantum attack with probability q(1−pc)),
or blocks the quantum channel with probability 1 − q. Note
that assumption A1 can be assumed without any loss of
generality [22]: it has been shown that it is sufficient to
consider collective attacks. In the following, we specify the
class of blinding attacks that we are considering.
Source MeasurementAdversary
Fig. 2. Modeling attack strategies. We consider that Eve either attacks the
protocol or blocks the quantum signals. If she attacks the protocol, then she
either mounts a blinding attack or a quantum attack. In the case of a blinding
attack, we assume that she has complete control over the measurement device,
i.e., she can externally control the response of the measurement device.
Detector blinding attacks. A blinding attack is carried out in
two phases. In the first phase, Eve does the fake-state attack,
i.e., she measures the quantum signal sent by Alice in one
of the two possible bases and records the basis choice and
outcome in ye and be, respectively. Then in the second phase,
she blinds the detectors (e.g., by bright illumination) and sends
a signal carrying ye and be to the blinded measurement device.
In this case, the response of the blinded measurement device is
dependent on Eve’s basis choice, ye, and Bob’s basis choice, y.
That is, the measurement device outputs a conclusive outcome
b = be only if Bob’s basis choice matches Eve’s basis choice.
Otherwise, the device outputs an inconclusive outcome, i.e.,
b = ∅. This guarantees that Eve’s and Bob’s bit strings are
identical.
Quantum attacks: The quantum attacks considered here are
the standard ones used in most security analyses of QKD to
date, i.e., collective attacks. In addition, we assume that Eve
always forward a single-photon to Bob wherever a quantum
attack is mounted.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
For simplicity, we consider the asymptotic security where
Alice and Bob exchange a large number of quantum signals.
This allows us to neglect all finite-size corrections necessary
for the security analysis (e.g., see Ref. [8]).
As mentioned above, the key idea of varying the efficiency
of the detectors is to introduce a knowledge gap between Eve
and Bob, so that the expected detection rates conditioned on
4the choice of detector efficiency are inaccessible to Eve. In
order to formalize this intuition, we need to first relate the
expected detection rates to the aforementioned attack model.
The conditional detection rates are
Rk = qpcfc(ye, y) + q(1− pc)ηk, (1)
for k = 1, 2. Here, fc(ye, y) is the response function of the
blinded measurement device, or equivalently, the probability
of having a conclusive outcome. Note that fc(ye, y) is upper
bounded by the probability that Eve guesses correctly the basis
choice of Bob. In particular, if Alice and Bob each choose the
key basis (say, the linear polarization basis) with probability
px > 1/2, then fc(ye, y) ≤ 1 − 2px(1 − px). Using the
assumption that fc(ye, y) is independent of Bob’s detector
efficiency choice, it is easy to show that
qpcfc(ye, y) = max
{
η1R2 − η2R1
η1 − η2 , 0
}
=: γ. (2)
Note that in general fc(ye, y) may depend on the choice of
ηk. However, for the type of blinding attacks considered here,
it is reasonable to assume that the detector’s response function
is independent of ηk, since it is optimal for Eve to maximize
the control of the detectors whenever they are blinded [10].
Moreover, under the conservative assumption that blinding
attacks introduce zero errors and that the errors are indepen-
dent of Bob’s basis choice, the probability of observing an
error (conditioned on Bob choosing ηk) is
gk = q(1− pc)ηkλ, (3)
for k = 1, 2 and λ is the single-photon error rate (due to
quantum attacks). That is, in the asymptotic limit, Alice and
Bob observe a conditional error rate of eobs,k := gk/Rk. In
this case, the phase error rate in the raw key pair (recall that
it is formed using data from the linear basis and η1) can be
upper bounded by
eph ≤ γ
2R1
+ eobs,1. (4)
Indeed, if pc = 0, then the expected phase error rate is eph = λ,
which is simply the quantum error rate. For error correction,
we only need to correct for the number of observed errors.
In particular, we assume that Alice and Bob executes an one-
way error correction scheme that reveals h2(eobs,1) fraction of
the raw key pair. Here, h2(·) is the binary entropy function.
Finally, using the security bound from Ref. [23], we see that
the secret key fraction, i.e., the fraction of secret bits that can
be extracted from the raw key pair, is
1− h2
(
γ
2R1
+ eobs,1
)
− h2 (eobs,1) . (5)
From the above, we see that if γ = 0, then Eq. (5) becomes
1 − 2h2(eobs), which is the secret key fraction for the BB84
protocol under the assumption of a binary symmetric channel
with error rate eobs [23].
Indeed, the intuition behind the countermeasure proposed
in Ref. [15] is compactly captured in Eq. (2). Particularly, it
quantifies how often Eve mounts a successful detector blinding
attack in terms of the difference between the two conditional
detection rates. For instance, if Eve mounts a blinding attack
(that is independent of ηk), then this necessarily introduces a
difference proportional to η1R2− η2R1. On the other hand, if
Eve mounts only quantum attacks, then the expected detection
rates should be R1 = tη1 and R2 = tη2, where t is the
transmissivity of the quantum channel. In this case, γ = 0.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As we have shown above, by adopting a simple counter-
measure, it is possible to rule out a large class of powerful
detector-side channel attacks. In particular, the considered
countermeasure is useful against detector blinding attacks like
the ones proposed in Ref. [5], where Eve employs fake-states
together with blinding. The central idea behind these attacks is
that Eve is able to manipulate the detection efficiency of Bob’s
measurement device, i.e., the response of the measurement
device is fully controlled by her. Therefore, the blinded
measurement device can be viewed as a black box whose
response function is dependent on Eve’s input signal and the
measurement choice of Bob. The proposed countermeasure
overcomes this by randomly varying the efficiency of the
detectors, that is, under the assumption that the additional
randomness is independent of Eve, the conditional detection
rates can be used to reveal how often Eve makes a blinding
attack. Importantly, this quantitative measure gives a bound on
the phase error rate.
Admittedly, the proposed countermeasure is not a solution
to all possible detector side-channel attacks. The reason for
this limitation is that our security bounds strictly requires
that fc(ye, y) is independent of ηk, which is rather restrictive
and does not apply on time-shifting attacks [4]. Indeed, such
attacks essentially send original quantum signals to Bob and
fc(ye, y) is dependent on ηk. However, the basic idea of
randomly varying parameters of Bobs measurement device
still works, e.g., by randomly changing the time delays of
the detection windows. Therefore, a combination of different
convenient countermeasures have to be implemented in order
to rule out a large class of side-channel attacks.
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